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Abstract
The political system in China is often referred to as political meritocracy. This
study develops a simple model of political meritocracy that captures democracy and
dictatorship as special cases. Then, we use the model to explore the strengths and
weaknesses of a meritocratic system relative to a democratic system. We find that po-
litical meritocrats would choose economic policies that are more conducive to economic
activities and lead to higher income but less public goods. Whether the meritocratic
or democratic equilibrium achieves higher social welfare depends on the distribution
of individuals’ abilities. If the median voter’s ability is lower than the mean of the
population, then the meritocratic equilibrium can achieve higher social welfare than
the democratic equilibrium. Also, there is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness
in the meritocratic system above which political meritocracy dominates democracy in
social welfare, and this threshold degree is increasing in the median voter’s ability.
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Over the past three decades, China has evolved a political system that can
best be described as "political meritocracy". Bell (2015)
1 Introduction
In China, the Politburo (a group of 25 leaders of the Communist Party) oversees the party,1
which governs the country. The Politburo is nominally elected by the Central Committee,
which comprises other leaders of the party and currently has 205 full members. Members
of the Central Committee are elected once every five years by the National Congress. The
roughly 3000 delegates of the National Congress are in turn elected by provincial congresses.
In other words, the Communist Party of China operates a system of elections in which dele-
gates at one level vote for delegates to the next level. The attainment of party membership
in turn is based on political screening, educational credentials and professional expertise.
This political system in China is often referred to as "political meritocracy–the idea that
political power should be distributed in accordance with ability and virtue"; see Bell (p. 6,
2015).2
This study develops a simple model of political economy that captures political meritoc-
racy as a general case and also democracy and dictatorship as special cases. Then, we use
the model to explore the strengths and weaknesses of a meritocratic system in which political
meritocrats design economic policies. Comparing such a political system to a democratic
system dominated by the median voter, we find that political meritocrats would choose eco-
nomic policies that are more conducive to economic activities and give rise to a higher level
of income,3 but a lower level of public goods than democracy.4 Interestingly, it is possible for
the meritocratic equilibrium to achieve a higher level of social welfare. Using the utilitarian
welfare function to aggregate the quasi-linear utility of individuals, we find that whether the
meritocratic or democratic equilibrium achieves a higher level of social welfare depends on
the distribution of individuals’ abilities.5 If the ability of the median voter is higher than
the mean of the population, then the democratic equilibrium would achieve a higher level of
social welfare than the meritocratic equilibrium. However, if the ability of the median voter
is lower than the mean, then the democratic equilibrium may achieve a lower level of social
1Within the Politburo, there is the Standing Committee, which currently has 7 members.
2It is useful to note that this concept of political meritocracy is related to but also different from tech-
nocratic democracy. Conceptually, the former concerns the distribution of political power to those with
high ability, whereas technocratic democracy is about governance by those with high ability. For example,
Singapore is often considered as a classic example of technocratic democracy. Given that there is universal
suffrage in Singapore, it does not satisfy the definition of political meritocracy that distributes political
power unevenly and in accordance with ability.
3This implication is consistent with the incentives faced by politicians in China. Chen et al. (2005) and
Li and Zhou (2005) provide empirical evidence that provincial economic performance has a positive and
significant effect on the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders in China. As a result, they are more
likely to pursue policies that are more conducive to economic activities.
4Lake and Baum (2001) and Deacon (2009) provide empirical evidence that a more democractic society
tends to have a higher level of public good provision. However, it is useful to note that these studies focus
on democracies versus autocracies, rather than political meritocracy.
5Given the individuals’ quasi-linear utility, a welfare improvement would also be a Pareto improvement
in the presence of lump-sum transfers.
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welfare than the meritocratic equilibrium.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. Our model features
heterogeneous individuals, who have different levels of ability and earn different levels of
income. The government levies an income tax to collect tax revenue and pay for public goods.
Individuals with higher abilities earn higher income and prefer a lower tax rate. Given that
individuals’ preferences in the tax rate are single-peaked, the median voter theorem applies
in the case of majority voting. Because the high-ability political meritocrats prefer a lower
tax rate than the median voter, the levels of employment and output are higher but the level
of public goods is lower in the meritocratic equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium.
Furthermore, the tax rate preferred by the median voter is generally different from the
socially optimal tax rate. If the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the
population, then the median voter’s preferred tax rate would be higher than the socially
optimal tax rate. In contrast, the tax rate preferred by the high-ability political meritocrats
is lower than the tax rate preferred by the median voter. In this case, the meritocratic
equilibrium may achieve a higher level of social welfare by offsetting an inefficiency in the
democratic equilibrium dominated by the median voter. Furthermore, there is a threshold
degree of political inclusiveness in the meritocratic system above which political meritoc-
racy dominates democracy in terms of social welfare, and this threshold degree of political
inclusiveness is increasing in the ability of the median voter relative to the mean of the
population. Therefore, as the ability of the median voter increases over time, the degree of
political inclusiveness in the meritocratic system should also increase.
This study relates to the literature on majority voting. The median voter theorem was
introduced and formalized in the seminal studies by Hotelling (1929), Black (1948) and
Downs (1957). Meltzer and Richard (1981) apply the median voter theorem to explore
the equilibrium tax rate that would emerge in a general equilibrium model.6 The Meltzer-
Richards model has led to the development of a vast literature; see for example Dotti (2020)
for a recent study and a discussion of earlier studies. While Meltzer and Richard (1981) focus
on income redistribution via taxation, Dotti (2020) allows for the provision of public goods
and explores how the mean-to-median income ratio affects the progressivity of the tax system
and the size of the government.7 Wemake a novel contribution to this literature by examining
the welfare difference between the equilibrium tax rates chosen in a democratic majority
voting system versus a meritocratic voting system.8 This welfare comparison depends on
the degree of political inclusiveness under the meritocratic voting system, and the threshold
degree of political inclusiveness depends on the mean-to-median income ratio in the economy.
In our analysis, an increase in the degree of political inclusiveness is essentially an expansion
of voting rights. Our analysis implies that democratization by expanding voting rights does
6See also Roberts (1977).
7Dotti (2020) also explores the optimality of the equilibrium tax rate and finds that it is often below the
welfare-maximizing tax rate due to inequality aversion. In our model, the equilibrium tax rate can be below
or above the welfare-maximizing tax rate, and the empirically relevant case is that the equilibrium tax rate
is above the welfare-maximizing tax rate due to the median ability being lower than the mean ability, where
ability is reflected by income in data.
8Ledyard (1984) is the first study that connects utilitarianism and majority voting to explore its welfare
implications. See Krishna and Morgan (2015) for a recent study, which explores the conditions under which
majority voting may yield the optimal outcome, and a review of other studies on this topic.
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not necessarily increase the level of social welfare in the society and that there is an optimal
degree of partial democratization.
Our study relates most closely to the literature on theoretical studies in the Chinese
political system. In this literature, Che and Qian (1998) model the advantages of local gov-
ernment ownership of firms (over private ownership and state ownership) in order to explain
its importance during the transition of the Chinese economy towards a market economy. Che
et al. (2017) show that self-serving autocratic leaders may choose a more optimal degree of
decentralization than democratic voters and correct an inefficiency in democracy. Che et al.
(2019) explore how the removal of criminal immunity of leaders may affect government cor-
ruption and the economy. In dynamic growth models, Shen (2007) and Chu (2010) explore
the different conditions under which a potentially non-benevolent government would choose
growth-enhancing policies and derive implications on economic growth in China. The present
study complements studies in this literature by showing the strengths and weaknesses of the
meritocratic system in China relative to a democratic system and comparing their different
effects on the economy and social welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
compares the two political equilibria. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs.
2 A simple model of political meritocracy
Our model is based on the general-equilibrium model of a labor economy in Meltzer and
Richard (1981) except that our model features public goods, instead of income redistribution.
In summary, the model features heterogeneous individuals with different levels of ability.
They elastically supply labor and consume their after-tax income. The government levies an
income tax and uses the tax revenue to pay for public goods.
2.1 Individuals with heterogeneous abilities
There is a unit continuum of individuals i ∈ [0, 1], whose abilities Ai > 0 are heterogeneous.





Aidi > 0. (1)
The ability of individual i determines her labor productivity in the production of a homoge-




where Li is the labor input of individual i and the parameter φ > 0 is elasticity of individual
output with respect to individual ability. For simplicity, we set φ to 0.5.9
9Our results are robust to other values of φ > 0; see Appendix B.
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Given that we will consider the utilitarian social welfare function, we specify a quasi-linear
utility function for individual i:10




where Ci is the consumption of individual i. The term θL
2
i /2 captures the quadratic utility
cost of labor supply, and the parameter θ > 0 determines the strength of this effect. G is
the level of public goods provided by the government, and the parameter β > 1 determines
the importance of public goods to individuals.11 Individual i pays an income tax τYi, where
τ ∈ (0, 1) is the tax rate. Then, she consumes her after-tax income such that
Ci = (1− τ)Yi. (4)










where we have also used φ = 0.5. Both Li and Yi are increasing in Ai and decreasing in τ .
2.2 Government









which uses (1) and (6). G is an inverted-U function of τ and captures the Laffer curve.
2.3 Optimal tax rate for an individual














10Our results are robust to a more general quasi-linear utility function ui = Ci − θL
χ
i /χ + βv(G), where
χ > 1, v′(.) > 0 and v′′(.) < 0; see Appendix B.
11Here we focus on utility-enhancing public goods that benefit all individuals equally, instead of
productivity-enhancing public infrastructure because it is not clear as to whether individuals with high or low
ability benefit more from public infrastructure. For example, if we set β to zero and assume Yi = G
1−φAφi Li,
then all individuals would prefer the same tax rate. However, if ability and infrastructure were complements
(substitutes) instead, then high-ability (low-ability) individuals would prefer more public infrastructure.
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A = 0, (9)
where the marginal cost of a higher tax rate is increasing in individual i’s ability Ai due to
the greater loss in after-tax income but the marginal benefit from public goods depends on







As shown in Figure 1, (10) determines the utility maximizing tax rate for individual i as






∈ [0, 0.5), (11)
which is increasing in β and decreasing in Ai/A. In other words, an individual with a higher
ability Ai (relative to the mean A) prefers a lower tax rate.
Figure 1: Utility maximizing tax rate
2.4 Optimal tax rate for the society












where the social marginal cost of a higher tax rate depends on aggregate ability A. Also, it
is useful to note that social welfare U is an inverted-U function of the tax rate τ . Taking the
first-order condition with respect to τ yields the socially optimal tax rate as
1− τ ∗
1− 2τ ∗
= β ⇔ τ ∗ =
β − 1
2β − 1
∈ (0, 0.5), (13)
which is strictly positive (given β > 1) and increasing in β.
6
3 Meritocracy versus democracy
In this section, we compare the different implications of the following two political equilibria
on the economy and the welfare of the society: a meritocratic equilibrium (in which political
meritocrats set the tax rate) and a democratic equilibrium (in which the median voter
determines the tax rate).
3.1 Political equilibrium tax rate under democracy
Given that individuals’ preferences on the tax rate are single-peaked, the median voter
theorem applies in the case of majority voting. Suppose the ability of the median voter is







∈ [0, 0.5). (14)
Here we assume Am < βA to ensure that τm > 0. The median voter theorem implies that
whenever voters are choosing between τm and any other tax rate, the majority would vote
for τm.
12 However, τm is generally different from τ
∗ (unless the median ability Am happens
to coincide with the mean ability A in which case the social marginal cost of a higher tax rate
coincides with the private marginal cost of the median voter). If the ability of the median
voter is higher than the mean of the population, then the democratic equilibrium tax rate
τm would be lower than the optimal tax rate τ
∗, and vice versa.
3.2 Political equilibrium tax rate under meritocracy
Without loss of generality, we order the individuals i ∈ [0, 1] in a reverse order of abilities; i.e.,
Ai ≥ Aj for any i ≤ j. Meritocrats are defined as individuals i ∈ [0, e], where e < 1 denotes
the mass of political elites in the society. In other words, meritocrats exclude individuals with
relatively low abilities. The inclusiveness of the meritocrats is measured by and increasing in
e. In the case of China, the set of political meritocrats may refer to (a subset of) the members
of the Politburo, the Central Committee, the National Congress, or more generally the
Communist Party, who have de facto voting power on the specific government policies being
considered. Our setup is general enough to capture the most extreme case of a dictatorship,
in which the set of power-holding meritocrats includes only the individuals with the highest
level of ability with e→ 0.
Government policies are determined by majority voting among the meritocrats i ∈ [0, e].13
Once again, the median voter theorem applies, and the tax rate is determined by the median
meritocrat. We denote the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate as






∈ [0, 0.5), (15)
12See Meltzer and Richard (1981) for a more detailed discussion.
13Here we assume that the meritocrats are not benevolent. If they were benevolent, it would be even more
likely for the meritocratic equilibrium to yield a higher level of social welfare.
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where Ae is the ability level of the median elite. The meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e
is increasing in the degree of political inclusiveness e via a decrease in Ae. However, given
e < 1, it must be the case that the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e is lower than the
democratic equilibrium tax rate τm because the median elite has a higher level of ability
than the median voter (i.e., Ae ≥ Am).
3.3 Meritocracy versus democracy
Given that the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e is lower than the democratic equilibrium
tax rate τm, (5) and (6) then imply that the aggregate levels of employment and output
are higher in the meritocratic equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium, whereas (7)
implies that the level of public goods is lower in the meritocratic equilibrium than in the
democratic equilibrium.14 Therefore, government policies chosen by political meritocrats are
more conducive to economic activities and give rise to a higher level of income but a lower
level of public goods. We summarize this result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The aggregate levels of employment and output are higher in the meritocratic
equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium, whereas the level of public goods is lower in
the meritocratic equilibrium than in the democratic equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Acemoglu et al. (2015) also use a theoretical model to show that democratization leads
to a higher tax rate and provide empirical evidence for this theoretical result.15 The above
proposition explores the implication of this higher tax rate on the aggregate levels of em-
ployment and output by taking into account the general-equilibrium effects in the Meltzer-
Richards model. The novelty of our analysis lies in the welfare comparison between the two
political equilibria, which turns out to depend on the distribution of individuals’ abilities.
Specifically, if the ability of the median voter is higher than the mean of the population, then
we would have the following outcome: τ e ≤ τm < τ
∗. Given that the democratic equilibrium
tax rate τm is suboptimally low, the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e (being even lower
than τm) must yield a lower level of social welfare; see Figure 2. We summarize this result
in Proposition 2.
14These theoretical results are consistent with the empirical evidence in Lake and Baum (2001), Chen et
al. (2005), Li and Zhou (2005) and Deacon (2009) as discussed in the introduction.
15Acemoglu et al. (2015) also provide some evidence for a negative effect of democracy on income inequal-
ity; however, they find that this negative effect on inequality is not robust. We find that democracy reduces
inequality in individuals’ utility even when income inequality is unchanged; see Appendix C. See also Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and Alesina et al. (2013) on how social beliefs affect redistribution and inequality.
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Figure 2: Welfare comparision 1
Proposition 2 If the ability of the median voter is higher than the mean of the popula-
tion, then the democratic equilibrium would achieve a higher level of social welfare than the
meritocratic equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The more realistic scenario arises when the ability of the median voter is lower than the
mean of the population,16 in which case the democratic equilibrium tax rate τm would be
higher than the optimal tax rate τ ∗. Then, we have two possible outcomes: (a) τ ∗ ≤ τ e ≤ τm
and (b) τ e < τ
∗ < τm. Case (a) occurs when the political meritocrats are relatively inclusive
(i.e., a relatively large e). In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e is closer
to the optimal tax rate and achieves a higher level of social welfare than the democratic
equilibrium tax rate τm; see Figure 3.
Figure 3: Welfare comparison 2
16If we use income as a proxy for ability, then the median income is lower than the mean income in China.
The median/mean ratio of urban residents’ disposable income increases from 0.88 in 2010 to 0.93 in 2019.
The median/mean ratio of rural residents’ disposable income increases from 0.88 in 2010 to 0.90 in 2019.
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Case (b) occurs when the political meritocrats are not very inclusive (i.e., a relatively
small e). In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e is below the optimal tax rate,
whereas the democratic equilibrium tax rate τm is above the optimal tax rate. In this case,
it would still be possible for the meritocratic equilibrium to achieve a higher level of social
welfare than the democratic equilibrium if τ e is close to τ
∗ whereas τm is far away from τ
∗;
see Figure 4. However, if e is excessively small such that τ e is far away from τ
∗, then the
meritocratic equilibrium would achieve a lower level of social welfare than the democratic
equilibrium; see Figure 5.
Figure 4: Welfare comparison 3 Figure 5: Welfare comparision 4
An increase in the degree of political inclusiveness e is essentially an expansion of voting
rights. Our analysis implies that democratization by expanding voting rights does not neces-
sarily increase the level of social welfare in the society and that there is an optimal degree of
partial democratization under which τ e coincides with τ
∗. Finally, there is also a threshold
degree of political inclusiveness e ∈ (0, 1) in the meritocratic system above which political
meritocracy dominates democracy in terms of social welfare; see Figure 6.17 Suppose the
political meritocrats prefer a meritocratic system with a minimal degree of political inclu-
siveness but need to ensure that the meritocratic system achieves at least as high a level of
social welfare as democracy in order to justify its legitimacy.18 Then, they will set e to e.
As the ability of the median voter increases relative to the mean (i.e., Am/A increases), the
democratic equilibrium tax rate τm decreases towards the optimal tax rate τ
∗. Given that
the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e is increasing in the degree of political inclusiveness,
the threshold degree e must increase in order for the meritocratic equilibrium tax rate τ e to
increase towards the optimal tax rate τ ∗ and restore the equality U(τ e) = U(τm). Therefore,
the threshold degree of political inclusiveness e is increasing in the ability of the median voter
relative to the mean of the population (i.e., e(Am/A) is an increasing function in Am/A).
17Figure 6 assumes that an interior e ∈ (0, 1) exists; see the proof of Proposition 3 for other cases.
18There are different ways to formalize this mechanism. For example, Justman and Gradstein (1999) model
the dissatisfaction of individuals without voting rights as a cost to the society. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2001) model the threat of revolution initiated by individuals without voting rights. These studies apply
their models to explore the process of democratization in Britain and other European countries; see Lizzeri
and Persico (2004) for a more recent study and a discussion of other studies on this topic.
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As the ability of the median voter converges to the mean of the population, the threshold
degree e converges to unity. In this case, the meritocratic system must become fully inclusive
in order to achieve the same level of social welfare as the democratic system. Proposition 3
summarizes this result.
Figure 6: Threshold degree e
Proposition 3 If the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the population,
there is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness e ∈ (0, 1) in the meritocratic system above
which political meritocracy (weakly) dominates democracy in terms of social welfare. This
threshold degree e is (weakly) increasing in the ability of the median voter relative to the
mean of the population.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a simple model of political economy to explore the strengths
and weaknesses of a meritocratic system relative to a democratic system. In summary, we
find that political meritocracy is conducive to economic activities and may also lead to a
higher level of social welfare than democracy, depending on the distribution of individuals’
abilities. For a developing country in which mass schooling is not widespread, the ability
of the median voter is likely to be below the mean of the population, in which case there
is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness above which political meritocracy dominates
democracy in terms of social welfare. As the country becomes more developed and mass
schooling becomes more widespread, the ability of the median voter increases, and the degree
of political inclusiveness should also increase. In other words, as a country becomes more
11
developed and voters become more educated, even a meritocratic system should become
more politically inclusive.19
Finally, it is useful to note that our simple model certainly does not capture all the real-
istic features of the Chinese political system. For example, we consider a very simple model
with a single-dimensional policy space and hence have to leave the interesting question on
how a multi-dimensional policy space affects the welfare analysis to future research. What
our model captures is the essence of political meritocracy, which is the idea of distributing
political power in accordance with ability, as described in Bell (2015). Our analysis implies
that this seemingly inequitable political system can be more efficient than an equitable de-
mocratic system by improving the welfare of the society. Therefore, the comparison between
democracy and political meritocracy can be viewed as an equity-efficiency tradeoff. Although
the inequity in political meritocracy may widen inequality, it also raises the level of income
even for the less well offs in the society and could potentially help to reduce poverty. Having
eradicated extreme poverty in China, the government is now shifting its focus to the equity
side of the tradeoff by pursuing a policy of "common prosperity".
19Xi (2017) provides empirical evidence that as a country becomes more developed, the importance of
political inclusiveness on economic growth also increases.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Given Ae ≥ Am, (10) implies that τ e ≤ τm < 0.5; see Figure 1.









Yidi. Finally, use (7) to show that G(τ e) ≤ G(τm).
20
Proof of Proposition 2. Given Ae ≥ Am > A, (10) implies that τ e ≤ τm < τ
∗. Then, the
inverted-U relationship between U and τ implies that U(τ e) ≤ U(τm) < U(τ
∗); see Figure
2.
Proof of Proposition 3. If Am < A, then (10) implies that τm > τ
∗, and U(τm) < U(τ
∗)
by the definition of τ ∗. Given the inverted-U relationship between U and τ , there exists a

















where U(τm) is decreasing in τm because τm > τ
∗. If τ e ≥ τ , then U(τ e) ≥ U(τ) = U(τm);
see Figure 3 and 4. If τ e < τ , then U(τ e) < U(τ) = U(τm); see Figure 5.
Then, recall that Ae is (weakly) decreasing in e and that τ e is decreasing in Ae. Therefore,
τ e is (weakly) increasing in e. If lime→0 τ e < τ , then there exists a threshold e ∈ (0, 1) above
which U(τ e) ≥ U(τ) = U(τm), where τ e ≥ τ that is derived in (A1). If lime→0 τ e > τ , then
U(τ e) ≥ U(τ) = U(τm) for all e ∈ (0, 1). In this case, a rise in Am/A decreases τm and
increases U(τm), which in turn makes an interior threshold e ∈ (0, 1) more likely to exist.
When a binding interior threshold e ∈ (0, 1) exists as in Figure 6,21 a rise in Am/A that
decreases τm leads to an increase in τ as (A1) shows. Then, τ = τ e(e) implies an increase in
e. Therefore, a rise in Am/A either does not affect e or causes e to increase.
20Recall that τ i < 0.5 for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, G must be increasing in τ i.
21An interior threshold e may not be binding (i.e., τe(e) > τ) due to potential gaps in the general
distribution of Ai, in which case e is independent of Am/A until it becomes binding (i.e., τe(e) = τ).
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Appendix B: Generalized utility and production functions
In this appendix, we examine the robustness of our results by considering a more general
quasi-linear utility function given by
ui = Ci −
θLχi
χ
+ βv (G) , (B1)
where χ > 1, v′(.) > 0 and v′′(.) < 0. The production function is given by (2), where φ > 0.






















(B2) and (B3) show that Li and Yi are decreasing in τ (so long as χ > 1) and increasing in








































































χ (1− τ)− 1
(χ− 1) (1− τ)
A
χφ
χ−1 = 0, (B7)
which determines the utility-maximizing tax rate τ i for individual i as
(χ− 1) (1− τ i)


















The left-hand side (right-hand side) of (B8) is increasing (decreasing) in τ i for τ i ∈ [0, (χ− 1)/χ).
Also, τ i is decreasing in Ai so long as φ > 0 and χ > 1. The utilitarian welfare function of






























which is an inverted-U function of the tax rate τ given v′(.) > 0 and v′′(.) < 0.22 Differenti-
ating (B9) with respect to τ yields the socially optimal tax rate τ ∗ as
(χ− 1) (1− τ ∗)














where the left-hand side (right-hand side) is increasing (decreasing) in τ ∗ for τ ∗ ∈ [0, (χ− 1)/χ).
As in our benchmark model in the text, the median voter’s preferred tax rate τm is
generally different from the socially optimal tax rate τ ∗ unless the median voter’s ability
Am happens to equal the CES aggregate of individuals’ ability A. If Am > A, then we
have τ e ≤ τm < τ
∗ because Ae ≥ Am. In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium is worse
than the democratic equilibrium in terms of welfare. If Am < A, then we have either
τ ∗ ≤ τ e ≤ τm or τ e < τ
∗ < τm. In this case, the meritocratic equilibrium may be better
than the democratic equilibrium in terms of welfare, depending on the degree of political
inclusiveness e. Therefore, all our results are robust to the generalized utility and production
functions.
22Here we also require βv′ (.) > 1 as a sufficient condition.
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Appendix C: Utility inequality
In this appendix, we compare the degree of inequality in individuals’ utility under the two
political systems. We measure utility inequality by the coefficient of variation of individuals’














0.5 (1− τ) (Ai/A) + βτ
0.5 (1− τ) + βτ
. (C2)
Substituting (C2) into (C1) yields
σU =
1− τ







2 di is the coefficient of variation of individuals’ ability. Equation
(C3) shows that utility inequality σU is decreasing in τ given β > 1. Because the tax rate
in the meritocratic equilibrium is lower than that in the democratic equilibrium (i.e., τ e ≤
τm), utility inequality in the meritocratic equilibrium is higher than that in the democratic
equilibrium (i.e., σU(τ e) ≥ σU(τm)). Here we use the simple utility and production functions
in the main text. Our result also applies to the generalized utility and production functions
in Appendix B.23
23Derivations are available upon request.
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